

What Defines A Successful Peacekeeping Mission: An Analysis  
of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) In Bosnia  
and Herzegovina

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## Introduction

Peacekeeping was developed as a technique to resolve and control armed conflict in the post-World War II era, and is most notably utilized by the United Nations (UN) (Goulding 1993). According to the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *peacekeeping* is defined as any formal operation incorporating any one, or combination of, the following five peace and security activities: conflict prevention, peacemaking through diplomatic measures, peacekeeping through military measures, peace enforcement through military actions, and peace building (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 15).

Peacekeeping missions have faced large structural and organizational changes since the UN's founding in 1945. With a particular emphasis on peace operations in the post-Cold War era, both the UN and global community have witnessed an increase in the deployment of missions. The political global atmosphere today is increasingly prone to armed conflict and intrastate violence. As a result, the UN and other international organizations must work hard to deploy new operations to adequately address these conflicts as they arise.

Studying peace operations and their respective success or failure is vital for understanding the source of armed conflict, the elements that comprise a successful mission, and working toward a more stable and secure global society. As noted by Paul Szasz, a political scientist specializing in peacekeeping operations, "All United Nations 'peacekeeping' missions are different. Thus, the activities carried out by the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are very different from any that the Organization has undertaken elsewhere, even the other operations in the former

Yugoslavia” (Szasz 1995, 685). As a result, peacekeeping missions are complex and difficult to categorize.

This thesis seeks to better understand the events of the United Nations Protection Force’s (UNPROFOR) mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this thesis, I will analyze the mission to determine whether it was a failure or success based on a set of criteria collected from the Literature Review. If the mission is deemed a failure by these standards, this thesis will seek to determine what specific elements of the operation led to that failure. It is important to determine whether the mission was a success or failure to help improve future peace operations and identify the specific events of the Bosnian War to better understand the effectiveness of UN intervention.

## **Background**

This section will briefly discuss the history of the Bosnian War and UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish a basis for understanding the conflict. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia) (Map 1, Page 50), was formed after World War II and encompassed six Balkan republics; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In the context of this thesis, the Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be referred to as Macedonia. Each republic contained its own ethnic group and political organization, but was united under one overarching government. Political relations between the different ethnicities were tense, most notably the conflict between Serbs and Croats. Ethnic relations were the least strained in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the country’s three ethnic majorities; Bosniaks (also referred to as Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats

(“The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide”; see also “Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR” 1996).

Relations between ethnic groups throughout the country bettered under the dictatorship of President Josip Broz Tito. Despite their staunch differences, Tito united the six republics by asserting strong military dominance and utilizing the rise of Yugoslavia’s Communist Party. Yugoslavia’s Communist Party was multinational, and was a strong advocate for a unified republic and national equality. The Party gained momentum by alienating other extremist parties and appealing to nationalists. Under Communist rule, Tito was able to control the country and subdue hostilities by appealing to new Yugoslav identities emerging after World War II (Djilas 1995).

Tito ruled Yugoslavia from 1943 until his death in 1980. Yugoslavia grew politically unstable after Tito’s death as old ethnic tensions reappeared. After Tito’s death, each republic sought to control its own sovereignty as an independent state, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia), composed of the Serbian and Montenegrin republics. It is worth noting the difference between SFR Yugoslavia, which included all six republics, and FR Yugoslavia, which only included Serbia and Montenegro. With persistence from Serbia, FR Yugoslavia hoped to keep the Yugoslav republics from gaining their independence. Despite FR Yugoslavia’s efforts to control the four rogue republics, SFR Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence (“The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide”).

After the collapse, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Macedonia formed their own respective independent states. Map 2 (Page 51) illustrates the borders and cities of present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1991, the ultra-nationalist Serbian President Slobodan Milošević began mobilizing Serb minorities in the newly created countries. He spread propaganda and fake news stories of Serbs being attacked by other ethnic groups to exploit the already tense relationship between Serbs and Croats. Under the guise of protecting Serb minorities, Milošević declared war on Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Slovenia. With some military backing from FR Yugoslavia, Milošević and his Serbian army attacked Croatia and Slovenia in June 1991 (“The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide”).

In 1992, Milošević turned his attention to Bosnia-Herzegovina by mobilizing the Bosnian Serbs to protect themselves against the country’s Croat and Muslim populations. In response, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman mobilized the Bosnian Croats to defend themselves against the Bosnian Serbs. In this context, Bosnia-Herzegovina was used as a proxy war for ethnic cleansing between Serbia and Croatia (“The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide”).

Amid fears of escalated violence, the UN began its intervention in the Balkans in 1991 through UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 721. This resolution was created in response to a November meeting between the Secretary-General (UNSG) Personal Envoy, Milošević, Tudjman, the Secretary of State for National Defense of FR Yugoslavia, and Lord Carrington of the United Kingdom. Each Yugoslav party voiced their support for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in the region to prevent further violence. Although a ceasefire was established, it was almost

immediately broken shortly after when Bosnian Serbs began mass killings of Bosnian Croats and Muslims. It is worth noting the killings occurring during the war were not for the sake of ethnic cleansing, but rather to create ethnically homogeneous cities.

As the conflict began to escalate and Milošević turned his attention from Croatia and Slovenia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UNSC created Resolution 749 (1992), a response to the request from Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović to deploy more UNPROFOR peacekeepers into Bosnia-Herzegovina. From 1992 to 1993, the operation mandate of UNPROFOR troops extended to Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, with a presence in Slovenia. The mission would conclude in March 1995, to be replaced by the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), and the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) stationed in Zagreb, Croatia (“Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR” 1996).

The Bosnian War began in 1992 after Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence from FR Yugoslavia. The new state was soon invaded by the majority-Serb Yugoslav People’s Army, who backed the Bosnian Serbs, and the Croatian Army, who backed the Bosnian Croats. In April, the UN began its presence in the country by sending 40 military observers to Mostar. The UNSG and UNPROFOR pressured the region to negotiate a permanent cease-fire between the warring parties. With constraints from Croatia and Serbia, the UN was forced to withdraw some of its peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was only permitted to deliver humanitarian aid (“Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR” 1996).

In April and May 1993, the UN created six “safe zones” through UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 819 and 824. The cities included Srebrenica, Sarajevo (the most ethnically-integrated city), Žepa, Goražde, Tuzla, and Bihać. Also deemed “safe” cities, the “safe zones” were controlled by UN troops to better protect civilians and noncombatants from the war. However, the UN could not provide the resources or mandates to effectively protect the safe zones, thusly allowing some of the most detrimental massacres to occur in Europe since WWII (“The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide”).

The massacre at Srebrenica is considered the worst mass killing of the Bosnian War and the largest in Europe after the Holocaust. In July 1995, the Serb General Ratko Mladic bombed and infiltrated the city despite the presence of UNPROFOR. The Serbs targeted Srebrenica because it was predominantly Bosnian Croat and Muslim, and was located in a majority Serbian territory. This territory is later dictated the Republika Srpska by the Dayton Accords. Mladic and his army of Bosnian Serbs were able to gain access to the city because UN troops were prohibited from using force against the approaching army. The UN’s inability to act allowed Mladic and his forces to capture and kill more than 8,000 Croats and Muslims in the fields outside Srebrenica. Their bodies were buried in two mass graves. Aside from this estimate, there are few reports detailing the events of the massacre (“The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide”).

As the Yugoslav Wars reached an end, the Dayton Accords were negotiated in November 1995 between FR Yugoslavia (specifically Serbia), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. The Accords established a long-term ceasefire in the region between

signatories Milošević, Tudjman, Izetbegović, and the Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Saćirbeg. Representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and the European Union (EU) facilitated the negotiations (“Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina” 1995).

The Accords kept Bosnia-Herzegovina united as one nation, but established “two semi-autonomous entities” to prevent future conflict; the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and the Republika Srpska for the Bosnian Serbs. Each entity was permitted to organize their own separate political structures, educational systems, and economies. However, the Federation and Republika Srpska were required to nationally organize into a single, centralized government to ensure the country operated smoothly. While this was the intention of the Accords, realistically the country has since struggled to function efficiently under a tripartite presidency (“The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide”; see also “Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR” 1996).

An estimated 100,000 people were killed, most of them Bosnian Croats and Muslims. More than 200 UNPROFOR peacekeepers and uniformed personnel were also killed. It is difficult to study the Bosnian War because there are few reports and statistics detailing the events of the conflict (“The Bosnian War and Srebrenica Genocide”).

## **Literature Review**

The following literature review is divided into four sections representing the four major themes emerging from previous research; 1) The UN used humanitarian



assistance without military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2) Rising global skepticism in UN peacekeeping missions during the 1990s, 3) The UN's neglect of rising nationalism and the impact of influential regional actors, and 4) The UN's delayed adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and international accountability.

*1. The United Nations favored humanitarian assistance over military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.*

The context of peacekeeping operations is as important as the organization of the mission. The UN was permitted by the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia to deploy UNPROFOR into Bosnia-Herzegovina to address the country's escalating civil war as a humanitarian effort and international observer. Paul Szasz addressed this characteristic in his 1995 analysis on UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, published in the *Cornell International Law Journal*. According to Szasz, UNPROFOR was deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina to support humanitarian efforts by, "keeping open airports (especially Sarajevo), escorting and otherwise facilitating the movement of convoys, and performing other related tasks such as the repair of power, water, and sewage systems" (Szasz 1995, 687). Under this specific guise, "strictly military functions" are secondary concerns (Szasz 1995, 687).

UNPROFOR troops were greatly limited in their performance, as they had a lack of adequate equipment and an insufficient number of personnel to ensure UN mandates (Szasz 1995, 687). These mandates included the protection of UN-mandated "safe zones" and monitoring the no-fly zone issued in parts of the country by the UNSC (Szasz 1995, 687). The UN successfully delivered humanitarian

assistance to at-risk populations, but was not permitted to further protect these populations from the effects of the on-going war with military action.

Szasz continued to criticize the operation by adding, “Only by helping the parties implement these unfortunately short-lived cease-fires does UNPROFOR occasionally, briefly, and locally perform what might be considered classic peacekeeping operations” (Szasz 1995, 687). His reference to “classic peacekeeping operations” referred to UNPROFOR’s limited ability to mark lines of confrontation, facilitate discussions between opposing groups, control joint military commissions, control the use of heavy weaponry in high-conflict areas, and occasionally “interpose between armed units” (Szasz 1995, 687). According to Szasz’s analysis, the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a failure because it could not utilize military components, through the fault of the UN or a lack of consent from other parties involved.

A book released by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, entitled Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, reaffirmed Szasz’s argument. According to Doyle and Sambanis, “Stopping civil wars has never been more important... Internal (civil or intrastate) war has replaced interstate war as the paramount concern for organizations charged with maintaining international peace and security” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 3). Civil wars have a large impact on the security and economic standing of a country, and hold the potential to destabilize an entire region (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 3). This is true of the Bosnian War, where the international community feared the war could further destabilize the region and create a power vacuum in the Balkans.

Doyle and Sambanis stated, "Civil wars have regional contagion or diffusion effects, as they reduce rates of economic growth in both the directly affected countries and their neighbors" (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 3). The UN was unable to ease the effects of civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina because they could only provide humanitarian assistance to the country, as opposed to providing both aid and military directives. The combined approach of humanitarian assistance and military intervention would have provided the UN with the best opportunity to de-escalate the conflict and limit civilian casualties.

*II. Rising global skepticism of United Nations peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era and the withdrawn support from specific state actors allowed the Bosnian conflict to escalate.*

In the post-Cold War era, referring to the period between the late-1980s and mid-1990s, the nature of UN peacekeeping missions transformed to better adapt to new conflicts. This placed a global focus on *intrastate* conflict, like civil wars, as opposed to *interstate* conflict. In their book Understanding Peacekeeping, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams noted this transformation ushered in some hesitance and skepticism from UN member states. Skepticism especially grew among global powers, like the U.S. and Western Europe, as the number of UN peacekeeping deployments drastically increased to accommodate the changing political atmosphere (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 109).

This skepticism developed into withdrawn support from active peacekeeping missions. Srebrenica is an example of this. While the UNSC voted in favor of naming Srebrenica a "safe zone" to protect civilian lives, the zone was severely understaffed, under resourced, and lacked meaningful direction (Bellamy and Williams 2010,

109). At the beginning of the conflict in 1992, Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica were not issued clear mandates to protect the “safe zone” with force. In addition, they were not provided with enough troops, equipment, or supplies to adequately protect the majority Bosnian Croat and Muslim civilians inside from the advancing Yugoslav People’s Army (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 109, 117). Bellamy and Williams explained that, “The political will of member states to mandate and contribute to UN peace operations is related to the operational effectiveness of the organizations itself” (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 109). Therefore, it is unsurprising that the, “repeated failure of peace operations between 1992 and 1995 encouraged member states to curb their enthusiasm and limit their commitment,” to UNPROFOR (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 109).

Consequently, some states chose to withdraw their support for the UN mission to instead assist peacekeeping efforts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Bellamy and Williams explained that this withdrawn support forced single-state actors to lead peace efforts as the UN was unable to make negotiations to provide the resources and funding necessary to fulfill UN obligations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 109). Later in 1995, the U.S. led the Dayton Accords in Ohio between the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia in an attempt to end the regional conflict (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 109).

Marrack Goulding provided greater context for Bellamy and William’s conclusions with his 1993 publication to the *Royal Institute of International Affairs*. Goulding believed there was a stigma associated with peacekeeping missions during

the post-Cold War era, ultimately because they were specifically United Nations missions (Goulding 1993, 453). He wrote their “United Nationsness” was derived from three different factors: “They were established by one of the legislative organs of the United Nations..., they were under the command and control of the Secretary-General..., and their costs were met collectively by the member states as ‘expenses of the Organization’ under Article 17 of the Chapter” (Goulding 1993, 453-4).

As a result of these factors, many states were critical of where and from whom authority in peacekeeping missions derived from. In the years leading up to 1993, the UN had never commanded an enforcement operation, and instead authorized specific member states to use force as needed to assure compliance with its decisions (Goulding 1993, 463). According to Goulding, “This arrangement may raise questions about the extent to which the operation is – or is perceived to be – really under the United Nations and not controlled in reality by the member states contributing to the bulk of its troops” (Goulding 1993, 463). Within this discussion, Goulding perceived the UN’s weakness to be its lack of personalized authority, which may have contributed to its poor performance in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Another author who analyzed the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jane Boulden, specifically discussed the effects the international community’s withdrawn support had on the escalation of violence. Initially, UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Philippe Morillon, “planted himself [in Srebrenica] and announced that he intended to stay in Srebrenica until the Bosnian Serb siege of the city ended” (Boulden 2001, 92). Morillon’s dedication to protecting the UN-sanctioned safe zone in Srebrenica received, “mixed reviews within the UN

hierarchy,” and was short-lived (Boulden 2001, 92). The UN only provided enough funding and resources for Morillon and his troops to remain the Srebrenica until humanitarian aid was delivered (Boulden 2001, 92). Morillon was forced to leave shortly after, and the Bosnian Serb assault on the Croat and Muslim populations continued (Boulden 2001, 92).

In his own publication for the *World Bank Economic Review* in 2008, Nicholas Sambanis drew from his previous work with Michael Doyle to suggest the UN provide more attention to military operations and long-term nation-building and development, as opposed to solely short-term humanitarian assistance (Sambanis 2008). He noted that the effects of UN peacekeeping missions are not long-lasting, because the UN is unable to devote the resources and funding required to permanently intervene in long-term conflicts. In the abstract to his article, he wrote, “Peacekeeping operations contribute more to the quality of the peace... than to its duration, because the effects of such operations dissipate over time” (Sambanis 2008). Sambanis suggested the UN adapt strategies to incorporate a stronger military presence in some countries to help, “develop institutions and policies that generate economic growth” (Sambanis 2008).

Finally, many international actors have questioned how to identify peacekeeping operations as successes or failures. This is difficult as each operation is different from the ones before, and many may involve different means to de-escalate and prevent conflict. After reviewing and analyzing a publication from Paul Diehl, Robert Johansen identified two major criteria for assessing the success of a UN peacekeeping mission; by limiting armed conflict and promoting conflict

resolution. While Johansen acknowledges the importance of these factors, he also notes they have the potential to lead to misunderstanding. He discussed the influence outside factors have on the success of a mission, like the receptiveness of the host country and active participation of other parties involved. The UN cannot be held fully responsible if a mission “fails” (Johansen 1994, 307).

However, Johansen does acknowledge Diehl’s conclusions that peace operations are the most successful under the following conditions: active consent to a peacekeeping mission from the host state and all parties involved in the conflict, peacekeepers are “lightly armed and do not fire except in self-defense,” peacekeeping forces remain neutral in the conflict, the mission addresses interstate conflicts over intrastate conflicts, and the “geographic context enables peacekeepers to be deployed in relatively invulnerable settings in which they can easily detect violations and completely separate the combatants” (Johansen 1994, 307-8). Most international organizations and peacekeeping scholars have developed their own criteria for assessing the success of a peacekeeping operation, although Johansen believed Diehl offers one of the most applicable approaches.

### *III. The United Nations did not address the escalation and exploitation of ethnic identities and the rise of nationalism from regional actors.*

Bosnia-Herzegovina is historically comprised of three prominent ethnic groups; Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. In 1995, after the majority of the conflict in the country ended, Muslims constituted 45% of the population, Serbs 35%, and Croats 16% (Szasz 1995, 690-1). In his analysis of UNPROFOR, Paul Szasz discussed the impact the country’s demographics had on its political destabilization. While

Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into three distinct ethnic groups, the groups were relatively intermingled throughout the country. He wrote there were some areas with a higher concentration of one group compared to the others, but these concentrations were, “rarely marked and are even more rarely geographically extensive or coherent” (Szasz 1995, 691). This intermingling made it difficult to characterize any of the nation’s regions as belonging to one group over the others.

Szasz noted that the distinctions between the three ethnic groups have existed for centuries under the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, although tension was never as prevalent as it was after the fall of SFR Yugoslavia (Szasz 1995, 691). Even under Tito, the country experienced very little conflict (Szasz 1995, 691).

Further elaborating on Szasz’s analysis, Ben Lieberman explained the exploitation of ethnic identities in his 2006 article for the *Journal of Genocide Research*. Lieberman wrote, “Shocking violence by neighbors emerges as a major theme in numerous accounts of war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but at the same time many studies...reveal cordial and amicable relations between Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats” (Lieberman 2006, 298). Lieberman used interviews from a well-cited 1990 survey, where respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina described ethnic relations in SFR Yugoslavia as, “good or satisfactory” (Lieberman 2006, 298). Before the war began, there were virtually no significant political, social, or economic distinctions between ethnic groups.

The following quotes from respondents during their interview for the survey support this idea; “Although some of us were Muslim and some were Serbs, we all thought of ourselves as Yugoslavs. I know I didn’t look at friend...any differently



because they were Serbs,” “We were so close to each other,” and “I didn’t [know] of them who was Muslim, who was Serb. All my friends were the same for me” (Lieberman 2006, 298).

In his analysis, Lieberman explained the sudden escalation of ethnic-based conflict resulted from new arising national narratives. He wrote,

“Accounts of close relations between neighbors typically recall scenes of everyday life, of individuals as friends, classmates, and colleagues. Stories of ethnic rivalry, on the other hand, present narratives in which the same individuals function as members of enemy nations. This same paradox of a friendly neighbor who kills can be described with the concept of cognitive frames or ‘a mental structure which situates and connects events, people and groups into a meaningful narrative’” (Lieberman 2006, 299).

According to Lieberman, it was important to understand the significance of this context, especially in regards to UN and NATO interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UN did not provide UNPROFOR peacekeepers in the country with the information or resources they needed to adequately address the new and quickly spreading national narratives (Lieberman 2006, 299).

Distinctions between the ethnic groups were more ideological than physical, although some key characteristics easily allowed each group to identify one another.

In Tony Barber’s article for the *Independent*, written in Zagreb in 1992, Barber

emphasizes the underlying societal, linguistic, and religious tensions throughout SFR Yugoslavia. Each ethnic group had its own distinct history, language, and religion, and while daily interactions were pleasant, as described by Lieberman, the overarching societal interactions were more hostile. Serbs and Croats spoke similar languages, but utilized different alphabets. Serbs were majority Orthodox Christian, Croats were predominantly Catholic, and Bosniaks were Muslim. These key ideological differences allowed Serbs to mobilize and join other radicalized Serbs in protecting Serb-majority Bosnian towns and cities, and identify who was Croat and Muslim (Barber 1992).

The first-hand accounts of investigative journalist David Rohde help support Lieberman's conclusions. In his novel, Endgame: The Betrayal and of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II, Rohde used his skills as a journalist to study the context of the massacres in Srebrenica and interview several peacekeepers, former Serbian Army soldiers, and survivors (Rohde 2012). He explained that the three ethnic groups were racially identical, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was SFR Yugoslavia's most ethnically integrated republic (Rohde 2012). The overarching question in his introduction to the genocide was how the coexisting ethnic groups were radicalized to exterminate one another.

Rohde believed outside influence from Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman played a large role in fueling the war. Milošević was maniacally brilliant in his use of state-controlled violence to, "whip up nationalism and play on people's fears that past Serb suffering might be repeated," and express an urgency that Serbs needed to protect themselves by persecuting

Muslims and Croats (Rohde 2012). Under this context, “past Serb suffering” refers to propaganda utilized by Milošević to discuss violence against Serbs by Croatia and Muslims under the Ottoman Empire and during World Wars I and II (Rohde 2012; see also Barber 1992). Tudjman used similar tactics and propaganda to mobilize Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Croat population, providing funding to the Bosnian Croats to combat the Serbian-backed Bosnian Serbs. This left the Muslims with no outside backers, and no resources to protect themselves from Serbian attacks (Rohde 2012).

In this sense, Bosnia-Herzegovina was exploited as a proxy war for Milošević and Tudjman to divide the country into a Greater Serbia for FR Yugoslavia and a Greater Croatia for Croatia (Rohde 2012). Rohde described Bosnia-Herzegovina as very reactive and explosive, as it was clear both presidents were promoting violence against the other ethnic group (Rohde 2012).

Rohde also discussed his disappointment in the UN’s inability to sever the influence Milošević and Tudjman had in the war. In the preface to his book, he wrote, “All sides in the brutal war – including many Western and UN officials – have resolutely convinced themselves that they are blameless and the other side is guilty” (Rohde 2012). Rohde’s biggest grievance was the lack of accountability the international community displayed toward the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their subsequent inability to assist the country as it now attempts to move beyond the war (Rohde 2012). This grievance will be further discussed in the next theme below.

*IV. The United Nation and international community delayed their recognition of the vital role they play in preventing mass killings and other atrocities.*

Failed peacekeeping missions during the 1990s in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and Rwanda prompted necessary changes to the UN's structure and behavior. To address the vagueness and confusion associated with the responsibilities of the international community, and to ensure global leaders continued to support UN efforts in the future, Ramesh Thakur discussed the UN's development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in his 2006 book. The adoption of R2P and similar global accountability measures allowed the UN to take a firm stance against mass atrocities, and enforce a, "collective global responsibility alongside preventing and repelling armed aggression against states" (Thakur 2006, 1). While Thakur applauded this vital step in preventing future mass killings, the action was taken too late for states like Bosnia-Herzegovina (Thakur 2006, 1).

Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon also addressed the UN's acknowledgement of the role the international community must play in preventing global conflicts from escalating. In their article for the *American Journal of Political Science*, Hultman and her colleagues noted the UN's unanimous adoption of R2P required the international community to take greater responsibility to protect civilians against violence (Hultman et al 2013, 875). In their analysis, Hultman and her team also found, "increasing the number of UN troops and police significantly decreases violence against civilians by both governments and rebels. Peacekeeping successfully reduces civilian suffering if the UN commits larger numbers of appropriately tasked personnel to a conflict" (Hultman et al 2013, 876). When the UN combines military action with humanitarian assistance and nation-building

measures, its missions should be more successful in ensuring the long-term political stability of the host country.

*How will this thesis contribute to the existing research discussed above?*

The overall tone of the research argues UNPROFOR failed because it was ineffective in preventing the war from escalating. The findings of this thesis will seek to identify other factors impacting the UN's capabilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkan region. This thesis will specifically examine the influence regional actors played in the war, as many of the publications above disregard the impact Serbia and Croatia had on the war and UNPROFOR actions.

This thesis aims to contribute a greater context to UN peacekeeping missions, specifically UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Understanding the supposed failure of this peacekeeping mission is important in determining what factors help facilitate a successful one.

### **Hypothesis**

The following hypothesis will analyze UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina to determine its success at meeting the criteria for peacekeeping missions according to prior research collected in the literature review. Compiling criteria from Robert Johansen's analysis of Paul Diehl's conclusions, and the analyses from Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, I developed four criteria for assessing the success of the UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina: consent from the involved parties, peacekeeper military involvement and the use of force, peacekeeper impartiality

and conduct, and promoting conflict resolution at the conclusion of the mission. The hypothesis below references these four criteria:

Hypothesis: *The UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not meet the criteria necessary for a successful mission, and is therefore a failed operation.*

### **Measurement and Research Design**

This thesis will utilize qualitative and quantitative data to determine if UNPROFOR meets all four criteria listed above, and if not, what criteria the mission failed to incorporate. Based on these four criteria, I created a questionnaire (Appendix A, Page 49) to collect, organize, and assess different aspects of UNPROFOR.

The sheet will convert qualitative data into quantitative data (as detailed below), and will rely on different sources for collection. Measurement 1 refers to host consent and the receptiveness of each involved party to a peacekeeping mission. For the purpose of this thesis, *consent* is defined as the explicit, active permission of every actor and party involved in the conflict to UNPROFOR. I will collect data for this measurement from a 1996 case study from Christine Gray for Duke University, entitled "Host-State Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia."

Consent is the most important criteria to obtain when planning a successful peacekeeping mission because it ensures the involved parties understand the vital role the UN will play in facilitating the conflict. Consent also ensures the involved parties are receptive to accepting third-party assistance in ending the conflict and working toward a post-conflict plan to stabilize the affected countries.

After reviewing Gray's case study, I identified the following three actors involved in the conflict: the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia, and Croatia. For the purposes of this measurement, FR Yugoslavia will primarily refer to the actions of Serbia under Milošević. Using an ordinal-level scale of 1-5, I will measure the receptiveness of each government in complying with UN mandates, where 1 refers to no consent and no support given to the UN, and 5 refers to complete consent and full support given to the UN. I will collect data on the consent of these states from three different time periods to better accommodate the complex and changing attitudes during the Bosnian War: before the beginning of the war (1991), during the war (1992-1994), and at the end of the war (1995).

Ideally, each government should score 4 or 5 for each time period to signify their full support of and consent to UNPROFOR. However, based on the information provided in the Background section, I expect the governments' consent and compliance with the mission to weaken during the second and third time periods. Under this context, UNPROFOR will have failed to maintain consent of the operation from the host country and involved parties.

Measurement 2 will determine the extent military force was used by peacekeepers. In the context of this thesis, *force* is defined as the use of armed military intervention by peacekeepers during the mission. This includes firing on combatants or committing violence against members of the involved parties, but does not include the use of force for self-defense. This measurement is conditional, as some conflicts may require peacekeepers to use some level of force to protect themselves or ensure UN mandates are met.

Using the analysis of armed peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Bosnian War from Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik, this measurement will use an ordinal-level scale to determine the frequency of armed intervention from UN peacekeepers to control the conflict. I will collect qualitative data from the study and rate the peacekeeping forces with a score of 1-5 in accordance with the UN peacekeeping principles, with 1 referring to no use of force or an appropriate use of force and 5 referring to a consistent and inappropriate use of force.

Ideally, UNPROFOR should earn a score of 1 or 2 because the UN peacekeeping principles prohibit peacekeepers from using force or armed intervention unless specifically permitted. This method will be difficult to measure because there is no precedent for measuring UN peacekeeping force and the data is subjective. The report from Baumann and his colleagues offers the best analysis of peacekeeper conduct during the UNPROFOR mission, and I believe it is the most unbiased. I will use their analysis, in addition to news articles, to assign the rating for this measurement.

Measurement 3 will determine the impartiality and conduct of peacekeepers during UNPROFOR because the UN emphasizes the importance of neutrality and appropriate behavior during ongoing missions. In this thesis, *impartiality* refers to a peacekeeper's ability to withhold from unwarranted social, economic, military, or diplomatic intervention outside of UN mandates, and to avoid misconduct. In this context, *misconduct* refers to any observed instances of corruption, exploitation, inappropriate behavior, or abuses of power and authority.



Similar to Measurement 2, Measurement 3 involves subjective qualitative data. This question will be difficult to research because there is no database collecting all specific instances of UN scandals or misconduct during missions. As a result, I am very limited in what data I have access to. I will rely on the same report from Baumann and his team used in Measurement 2, reports from the UN, and news coverage of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina to determine the impartiality and conduct of the peacekeepers.

I will use an ordinal-level scale of 1-5 to measure the severity of the peacekeeper's impartiality and conduct during the mission, with 1 referring to an entirely unbiased and uncorrupted force, and 5 referring to an entirely biased force with many instances of misconduct. Ideally, the peacekeepers deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Bosnian War should score a 1 or 2, signifying an impartial peacekeeping force complacent to the UN code of conduct.

Lastly, Measurement 4 will determine how UNPROFOR concluded its mission in 1995. This measurement is based on one of Johansen and Diehl's recommendations for assessing the success of a UN peacekeeping mission. I will use UN reports to determine what steps they took to conclude UNPROFOR, how they removed troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and any actions they took to help facilitate peace in the country.

In addition, I will also consider the reflections of three Secretary-Generals to determine their conclusions of UNPROFOR: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UNSG from 1992-1996; Kofi Annan, the UNSG from 1997 to 2006; and Ban-Ki Moon, the current

UNSG. I believe these reflections will allow me to best assign the conclusion and success of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Similar to the other three measures, I will rate UNPROFOR's final actions and the programs the UN employed in Bosnia-Herzegovina to replace it (if any) on an ordinal-level scale of 1-5. 1 will refer to a successful post-conflict facilitation and removal of UNPROFOR troops, and 5 will refer to no post-conflict facilitation and a poor removal of UNPROFOR troops.

An ideal score for UNPROFOR will be a 1 or 2, as this indicates the least intrusive and most constructive methods for concluding the operation. A score of 4 or 5 will indicate an unsuccessful post-conflict facilitation where UN troops were either unable to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina without serious political repercussions, or were met with significant international backlash.

## **Results**

This section will briefly discuss the findings of the questionnaire and identify any trends in the data collected. The Discussion section below will offer a more extensive analysis, and explanations for the scores of each measurement.

Table 1 (Page 52) illustrates my findings for Measurement 1, which determines the consent for the UNPROFOR operation from the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia, and Croatia. In the context of this table and discussion, the government of FR Yugoslavia represents Milošević and the Serbian government. I utilized Christine Gray's publication focusing on consent during the UNPROFOR mission, and appropriate UNSC resolutions, to determine the receptiveness of the involved governments to the mission.

The first column of Table 1 shows strong consent for UNPROFOR in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina before the operation's formal deployment in 1991. Both governments from Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia received 5's for their receptiveness to the proposed operation. Croatia received a 4 because Tudjman did not provide full support to the UN on behalf of Croatia to the same extent as the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia.

There is an observed trend among each government where consent and receptiveness to the mission decreases as the Bosnian War progresses. In 1991, the governments were mostly in support of the mission, earning 4's and 5's. Between 1992 and 1994, consent to the mission significantly decreased, although no government entirely withdrew its consent to the operation. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most cooperative government throughout the duration of the war, with Croatia and FR Yugoslavia showing increasingly less receptiveness to UNPROFOR. By 1995, Croatia officially withdrew its consent to the mission and the Bosnian government became more skeptical. There was no change in rating for FR Yugoslavia.

Measurement 2 receives a score of 3, signifying little use of force by UNPROFOR peacekeepers, even though there should have been some use of force to fulfill some UN mandates. Table 2 (Page 52) illustrates three factors I collected information on from the report by Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, and from Table 3 (Page 53). These factors are the size of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping force, the necessity for use of force during the mission, and UN mandate leniency. Despite the lack of an effective protocol or the prevention of all violence during the war, the UN

partially fulfilled its protocol by permitting very little use of force throughout the operation, as shown in Table 2.

Measurement 2 did not receive an acceptable score as indicated in the Design section. 207 peacekeepers were killed throughout the duration of the operation. This is the highest number of deaths in any peacekeeping mission between 1990 and 2015, according to Table 3. In addition, peacekeepers were unable to prevent massacres in “safe cities” like Srebrenica because they were prohibited from using any force against any militarized group.

Measurement 3 receives a score of 3 based on the information represented in Table 4 (Page 54). This table organizes information collected from an article for *The Guardian* by Owen Bowcott, a report on UN peacekeeper misconduct from the Jordan Ambassador to the UN, and the same report on peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina used in scoring Measurement 2 from Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik. The table is organized into different sections relating to the UN’s official protocol for identifying and addressing instances of misconduct. This is further explained in the Discussion section below.

I found the peacekeeping force acted relatively unbiased in fulfilling UN mandates, although the most pressing issue for peacekeeper impartiality was the context of the war. As UNPROFOR peacekeepers were given the responsibility to protect high-risk, majority Bosnian Croat and Muslim “safe” cities, Bosnian Serb combatants misconstrued these protections as intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. This is expressed in the first row of Table 4.

In regards to peacekeeper misconduct, there were little to no recorded instances of disrespectful behavior, indicated in the second row of the first column of Table 4. However, peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina were charged with engaging in sex trafficking and soliciting sex at brothels. While there were few instances of sexual misconduct, the presence of such actions influenced me to score the overall impartiality and conduct of the UNPROFOR peacekeepers with a 3.

Measurement 4 receives a score of 2, representing the strong and responsive role the UN undertook after the conclusion of the initial UNPROFOR mission in March 1995. Table 5 (Page 54) represents data on three factors I identified from UN reports and relevant news articles. The first row lists the replacements for the conclusion of UNPROFOR, most importantly the restructured UNPROFOR (lasting from 1995-1996), and the replacement of IFOR with a multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR).

Row 2 of Table 5 specifically notes two UN missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina that helped facilitate peace and continued to promote political stability after the initial UNPROFOR mission was completed; the restructured UNPROFOR (1995-1996) and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These two operations will be further discussed in the Discussions section.

The most interesting data represented in Table 5 is the reflections from former UN Secretary-Generals Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, and Ban-Ki Moon. While each UNSG believed UNPROFOR was unsuccessful in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they attribute its supposed failure to different characteristics. I found this aspect of the table the most helpful in determining the score for Measurement 4, as insight

from Secretary-Generals is an integral part of assessing UN actions.

## **Discussion**

This section is organized into two subsections to discuss the significance of the questionnaire and relate its findings to the Hypothesis; *The UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not meet the criteria necessary for a successful mission, and is therefore a failed operation.*

The first subsection discusses the calculation of each measurement from the Results section. The second subsection discusses the collective significance of the questionnaire, and its relation to the Hypothesis.

### *I. An Explanation of the Measurement Scores*

#### Measurement 1: Consent

Table 1 illustrates my findings for Measurement 1. Focusing on the first column rating government consent in 1991, I decided to provide the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia with 5's because both provided explicit support for the deployment of the UNPROFOR mission. In a meeting between the UNSG and the UNSC in November 1991, the UNSG read a letter from Milošević to the Council on behalf of Serbia. The letter stated, "I have been instructed by my government to request the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia which reflects at the same time the expressed desire of the principal parties to the present conflict" (Gray 1996, 246).

In response to Milošević's letter, the UNSC created Resolution 721 (1991), which stated;

“Considering the request by the Government of [Serbia] for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in [SFR] Yugoslavia, [and] Considering further the fact that each one of the Yugoslav participants in the meeting with the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General stated that they wanted to see the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation as soon as possible” (Gray 1996, 246).

These two documents provided me with the basis for my rating of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia for 1991.

While Croatia was included in Resolution 721’s reference to SFR Yugoslavia, Croatia received a lower rating than the other two governments because Tudjman showed some reluctance in consenting to the UNPROFOR operation. He wanted to preserve Croatia’s newfound independence, and was hesitant in providing the UN with political and military access to the region. Despite this hesitation, Tudjman ultimately provided consent to the mission in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, earning Croatia a score of 4 (Gray 1996, 246).

The second column in Table 1 represents the period between 1992 and 1994, and proved more complicated for measuring government consent. The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina formally requested the presence of UN peacekeepers in the country in 1992 after Serbia invaded Croatia and Slovenia (Gray 1996, 247-8). While Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most willing party to accept UN peacekeepers, it also “demanded” the UN, “surrender some facilities it already occupied [in Bosnia-

Herzegovina], pay for other new facilities, and reopen negotiations on the terms of employment for local staff” (Gray 1996, 253).

Despite these demands, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the only government to complete the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) mandated by the UN. The completion of SOFAs was important for UNPROFOR for several reasons. It held “symbolic” importance in assuring the commitment of the involved states in cooperating with the operation (Gray 1996, 253). It also established a precedent for actions the UN could take when negotiating with the governments, and improved the “bargaining position of the UN forces in demanding cooperation from the... state” (Gray 1996, 253). I decided to assign the Bosnian government a score of 4 to reflect their growing reluctance to comply with UN protocol, but relative receptiveness to the mission.

In 1992, the government of FR Yugoslavia grew dissatisfied with UN intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. FR Yugoslavia did not agree the UN needed to protect the Bosnian Croats and Muslims from the mobilized (and Serbian-backed) Bosnian Serbs. In addition to refusing to host peacekeeping forces or accommodate UNPROFOR, Serbia refused to submit any SOFAs. Later, the UNSC passed Resolution 947 (1994) requiring both Croatia and FR Yugoslavia to complete their SOFAs. Neither country met this requirement (Gray 1996, 253).

I provided FR Yugoslavia with a score of 2 for its lack of cooperation with the peacekeeping operation. FR Yugoslavia did not earn a score of 1 because it did not formally withdraw its consent from the mission.



In regards to Croatia, Tudjman was mostly concerned the UN would infringe on Croatian sovereignty. In response to a letter from Tudjman, the UNSC issued Resolution 740 (1992), which dictated the following:

“Take note that the letter of President Franjo Tudjman of 6 February 1992, in which he accepts fully the Secretary-General’s concept and plan which defines the conditions and areas where the UN force would be deployed, removes a further obstacle in that respect... [but] expresses its concern that the UN peacekeeping plan has not yet [been] fully and unconditionally accepted by all in Yugoslavia on whose cooperation its success depends” (Gray 1996, 247).

This Resolution acknowledged a reluctant letter from Tudjman to the UNSC, where he accepted the UNSG’s terms for UNPROFOR, but expressed some hesitations at the “technical” details of the operation. The UNSG eventually managed to gain approval from Croatia to station peacekeepers at Sarajevo International Airport, but they were granted limited powers (Gray 1996, 248).

In addition to defying UNSC Resolution 947 in 1994, Croatia charged the UN \$8.6 million in fuel taxes and \$2.5 million in airport taxes between July and December. These charges were deemed “inconsistent not only with the UN Model SOFA, but also with the 1946 Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations” (Gray 1996, 254). Croatia became difficult to accommodate, placing further strains on UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result, I provided Croatia

with a score of 2 for its circumstantial consent to UNPROFOR between 1992 and 1994.

The last column in Table 1 measures government consent throughout 1995 before UNPROFOR was concluded. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the only state to express complete consent to the creation of a secondary UN peacekeeping force, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The UN established RRFs in June 1995 to help delegate UNPROFOR power, but not expand or add to it. The creation of RRFs was controversial, as it “led to further problems over the conclusion of SOFAs with the host states” (Gray 1996, 263). Some former Yugoslav governments argued, “the RRF was a new force separate from UNPROFOR and demanded the negotiation of a new SOFA” (Gray 1996, 263). I decided to provide the Bosnian government with a score of 3, because it was growing skeptical of UNPROFOR after the massacre in Srebrenica, but was not as uncooperative as the governments of FR Yugoslavia or Croatia.

The government of FR Yugoslavia maintained a hostile attitude toward UNPROFOR, but did not withdraw its consent to the mission. As a result, I scored FR Yugoslavia with a 2 for its continued defiance of UN resolutions and mandates.

The UNSG became “openly critical of Croatia’s failure to conclude a SOFA with regard to the [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO)], the force that had replaced UNPROFOR” (Gray 1996, 254). Croatia formally withdrew its consent to the UNPROFOR mission in January 1995 (Gray 1996, 266). This withdrawal warranted Croatia with a score of 1, although it is worth noting Croatia

continued to push for an end to the Bosnian War even after severing ties with UNPROFOR.

### Measurement 2: Use of Force

When determining the score for UNPROFOR peacekeepers' use of force during the operation in Measurement 2, I used the following factors shown in Table 2 to base my decision; the size of the peacekeeping force, the necessity for the use of force, and UN mandate leniency on peacekeeper authority. I chose these factors from emerging themes in Baumann's report.

Based on Table 3, the average troop size for UNPROFOR in SFR Yugoslavia consisted of 27,632 UN peacekeepers and uniformed UN personnel. Bosnia-Herzegovina entertained between 7,000-38,000 peacekeepers and uniformed UN personnel, significantly more than the average number of peacekeepers throughout the duration of the larger mission (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 27, 37). In addition, UNPROFOR required significantly more troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina than any other peacekeeping operation between 1990 and 2015. For context, the second-largest peacekeeping mission in Table 3 to the Democratic People's Republic of the Congo through MONUSCO only required 19,881 peacekeepers (as of 2015). Baumann and his team suggested a potential correlation between troop size and the escalation of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although there is not enough data available from the war to test this belief (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 27).

Based on the report from Baumann and his team, I concluded there was a necessity for some force in instances of violence against peacekeepers, to enforce

UN mandates, and to protect UN “safe cities.” According to Baumann, “The [UNPROFOR] force was largely ineffective as the UN peacekeepers possessed very restrictive rules of [engagement] despite the mushrooming ethnic conflict around them” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 27).

This factor was measured by how many peacekeepers were killed during UNPROFOR. According to Table 3, UNPROFOR entailed the highest number of UN peacekeeper and uniformed personnel deaths; 207. Canada’s director of Peacekeeping Policy from 1996 to 1999, Colonel Hatton, offered some explanation for this death toll. According to Hatton, “The problem lay not only with the flawed mandate but with the failure of the international community to provide all necessary resources, especially soldiers, to support mission requirements” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 44). Hatton believed the UN mandates needed more clarification for defining instances where self-defense was appropriate. Hypothetically, this could have prevented some of the deaths.

An UNPROFOR post-operation assessment claimed that to restore order and peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, peacekeepers needed the resources and authority to; “1) credibly demonstrate its resolve; 2) mount a credible show of force; and 3) have the means to effectively protect those it has been tasked to protect against forces equipped with tanks and artillery” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 40-1). The UN’s inability to permit some use of force in instances of violence against peacekeepers and in enforcing UN mandates greatly affected the ability of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UN resolutions strictly prohibited the use of force throughout the UNPROFOR mission. UN mandates denied peacekeepers with the “right to use military force in a proactive manner in support of international objectives” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 40). As a result, UNPROFOR “lacked the leverage” to enforce peace, and were “subject to innumerable indignities – harassment by snipers, seizure as hostages, and general abuse” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 40). Baumann identified UN mandates as the main trouble for UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, aside from the hostile and complex ethnic relations.

In 1993, the UNSC passed Resolution 819, which established “safe zones” in six Bosnian cities. The zones offered refuge to civilians from armed attacks and other hostilities, and allowed UN troops to deliver humanitarian assistance to those in need (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 45). Initially, this resolution prohibited any use of force by peacekeeping troops.

After peacekeepers became the repeated targets of attack from combatants, UNSC Resolution 836 (1993) was passed to better define UNPROFOR duties. The resolution claimed UNPROFOR needed to, “deter attacks against the areas... monitor the cease-fire... promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian government and... occupy some key point on the ground” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 45). Through Resolution 836, UNPROFOR was offered limited power to, “take all necessary defensive measures, including the use of force in response to bombardments, armed incursion, or deliberate obstruction of freedom” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 45). While the UN permitted some use of force, mandates were still strict in what constituted as an

attack or obstruction of freedom. UNPROFOR troops lacked the resources and clarity to appropriately utilize Resolution 836 to its full potential while protecting the “safe” cities.

When rating this measurement, I also considered a comparison of the military actions of UNPROFOR to the actions of an American-led mission after the war ended, the Dayton Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR is considered a more successful mission because it organized itself around more lenient and circumstantial mandates. It was also headed by a single country, as opposed to the UN, and thusly had less accountability to international protocol. In regards to IFOR, Baumann wrote,

“To Americans... UNPROFOR’s principal relevance was that it demonstrated exactly how not to conduct a military intervention in the midst of civil war and humanitarian crisis. Although UNPROFOR strength in Bosnia-Herzegovina reached 38,000 in 1994, it was weaker than even its inadequate numbers implied. Its largest combat elements were battalions, and each of these answered to different a national chain of command. Moreover, UNPROFOR lacked the authority and all too often the firepower to use force in a proactive manner” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 37).

Based on this comparison to IFOR and the information provided in Tables 2 and 3, I decided to score UNPROFOR with a 3 for limited use of force during the peacekeeping mission, although some use of force was needed.

### Measurement 3: Impartiality and Conduct

Measurement 3 collected information from the “Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects” by the Jordan Ambassador to the UN Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al-Husseini, an article from *The Guardian* discussing UN peacekeeper abuses, and the report on peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik. From these reports, I sorted the information into Table 4 as involving either peacekeeping impartiality or peacekeeping misconduct.

Baumann and his colleagues outlined several instances of misunderstanding related to peacekeeping impartiality during the UNPROFOR mission. While peacekeepers were present as neutral parties in the operation, only permitted to protect noncombatants in “safe” cities, some Serbian combatants interpreted UNPROFOR action as providing excessive protection to Bosnian Croats and Muslims because of their ethnic identities.

One of these instances was discussed in a December 1994 report from the UNSG to the UNSC. In this report, the UNSG,

“Not only acknowledged widespread difficulties experienced by UNPROFOR in securing the safe areas, but also offered a substantive analysis and tentative conclusions... As demonstrated in the case of Gorazde,

the presence of many Muslim fighters in the presumed sanctuaries jeopardized the perceived impartiality of UNPROFOR peacekeepers. As noted in the Secretary-General's report, 'After the first use of air power at Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs regarded UNPROFOR as having intervened on behalf of their opponents.' This circumstance resulted in increased obstruction of humanitarian relief convoys by the besieging Serb forces, a form of retaliation that struck at the heart of the UNPROFOR mandate. In addition, it was proof positive of UNPROFOR's lack of leverage with the armed factions...During an uneasy cease-fire in a 3-kilometer exclusion zone around Gorazde, UNPROFOR personnel found their movement restricted by both sides (Serbs and Muslims) and were frequently the targets of sniper fire" (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 46).

This report outlined the perceptions from some Bosnian Serb combatants that UNPROFOR intervened in the war in favor of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. This was evidently untrue, as peacekeepers were charged with protected the UN-mandated "safe" cities, many of which happened to host majority Bosnian Croat and Muslim civilian residents.

Overall, UNPROFOR mostly exemplified the UN code of conduct, which requires peacekeepers follow these three standards; 1) Respect local laws, customs,



and practices, 2) Treat the host country's inhabitants with respect, courtesy, and consideration, and 3) Act with impartiality, integrity, and tact ("United Nations Peacekeeping: Conduct and Discipline"). While peacekeepers mostly upheld these standards, UNPROFOR was ineffective in preventing peacekeepers from partaking in the sexual exploitation of trafficked women and children.

A 2005 report from Prince Zeid provided clarification for how the UN should recognize and combat sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Prince Zeid defined *sexual exploitation* as "any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another" ("Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects" 2005, 7). He also defined *sexual abuse* as "actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions" ("Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects" 2005, 7-8). This report discussed the alarming prevalence of sexual exploitation and abuse occurring alongside UN peacekeeping missions, including the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR is one of the first UN peacekeeping missions to receive backlash from the global community for peacekeeper misconduct. During the 1990s, investigators found some peacekeepers visited brothels in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo to engage in sexual acts with women forced into prostitution (Bowcott 2005). On behalf of the international community, Bowcott wrote for *The Guardian*, "The embarrassment caused by the misconduct of UN forces in devastated

communities around the world – including Haiti, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Cambodia, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – has become an increasingly high profile, political problem” (Bowcott 2005).

While I found information to suggest both peacekeeper bias (perceived by the Bosnian Serbs) and misconduct (sexual exploitation and abuse), I would not deem UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina as explicitly corrupt or immoral. I chose to score Measurement 3 with a 3 because peacekeepers were able to maintain a neutral position, even if some combatants did not perceive it as such. While the existence of any acts of sexual exploitation from peacekeepers during a mission is unacceptable, these acts did not directly impact the operation.

#### Measurement 4: Post-War Transition

After the war ended in October 2015, remaining UNPROFOR officials monitored the cease-fire between Croatia, FR Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in Dayton, Ohio. In signing the Dayton Accords, also referred to as the Peace Accords, the three Balkan nations agreed to, “conduct their relations in accordance with the United Nations Charter, fully respect the ‘sovereign equality of one another,’ settle disputes by peaceful means, and ‘refrain from any action against the territorial integrity of political independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina or any other state” (“UNMIBH: Background”). The signing of the Accords was considered a large success, as it ended the conflict and forced Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia to recognize one another as independent nations within their own international borders (“UNMIBH: Background”).

In reference to the first row of Table 5, the UNSC restructured UNPROFOR in

Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1995, ending the initial UNPROFOR operation in SFR Yugoslavia deployed in 1992. UNPROFOR was replaced with three separate but “interlinked” peacekeeping missions overseen by the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF). These missions were UNCRO (1995-1996) in Croatia, a restructured UNPROFOR (1995-1996) present throughout the Balkans, and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia (“Summary of AG-061”). The American-led IFOR was replaced with SFOR, a multinational force comprised of UN member states (“UNMIBH: Background”).

The most important initiative the UN implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the conflict ended was the establishment of UNMIBH from 1996 to December 2002. Mentioned in the second row of Table 5, UNMIBH was headed by both the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These two officials were charged with coordinating all UN activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the newly created UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), the result of UNSC Resolution 1035 (1995). The main components of UNMIBH were the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit, the Civil Affairs Unit, the IPTF, the Human Rights Office, the Office of Public Affairs, and other administrative offices working within the country for the UN. UNMIBH was eventually replaced with the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in January 2003 through the establishment of UNSC Resolution 1423 (2002) (“Summary of AG-061”; see also “UNMIBH: Background”).

Table 5 also accounted for the reflections from Secretary-Generals, which are important indicators in the success and conclusion of a peacekeeping mission. The

attitudes of three UNSGs are included in the third row of Table 5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali oversaw the duration of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as he was acting UNSG from 1992 to 1996. Boutros-Ghali believed the UN should have devoted more resources and peacekeeping troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. He initially wanted 35,000 troops sent to the warring nation, but was disappointed to only receive permission for 8,000 by member states (McFadden 2016).

In his farewell address to the UN in 1996, Boutros-Ghali, “chided member states [especially the U.S.] for failing to deal with disasters in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia.” He stated, “The concept of peacekeeping was turned on its head and worsened by the serious gap between mandates and resources” (McFadden 2016).

Kofi Annan, Boutros-Ghali’s successor, also dealt with the repercussions of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In October 1999 at a memorial ceremony in Sarajevo, Annan called the Bosnian war, “One of the most difficult and painful [missions]” in the history of the UN (“UN Bosnia Experience One of Most ‘Difficult and Painful’ in its History” 1999). In contrast with Boutros-Ghali, Annan believed the UN and the international community had a responsibility to intervene in the conflict, a belief reiterated by many of the sources in the literature review.

He concluded, “We will never forget that Bosnia was as much a moral cause as a military conflict. The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever” (“UN Bosnia Experience One of Most ‘Difficult and Painful’ in its History” 1999).

Ban Ki-Moon shared similar remorse for UNPROFOR as Annan. In a recent interview with Erol Avdovic, Ki-Moon reflected on his visit to a memorial site in Srebrenica in 2012. He stated,

“My most immediate reflection was connected to our collective failure, as international community, to protect the innocent victims from what the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) later qualified as genocide. In 1995 we failed to provide protection to many people who needed our support. We must never forget the lessons of Srebrenica, especially in the context of today’s crises: from Syria to South Sudan, people are still facing unspeakable violence and terror. The international community must do much more to protect those who turn to us for help. Let us not turn our backs when people turn to us. This should be our promise to the victims of Srebrenica” (Avdovic).

Ki-Moon believes the international community has a responsibility to protect other countries like Syria and South Sudan from facing similar events as Bosnia-Herzegovina (Avdovic).

## *II. The Collective Significance and Findings of the Questionnaire*

Based on the research and publications discussed in the Literature Review and Results sections, it is understood a successful peacekeeping operation must meet all four criteria I identified from the works of Johansen, Diehl, Bellamy, and Williams. An operation’s inability to fulfill any of these criteria compromises the UN’s reputation and undermines the success of the peacekeeping mission. According

to these conclusions, UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a failed operation because it was unable to fully incorporate three of the four criteria.

First, the UN was unable to maintain consent from the involved parties throughout the duration of the mission. This is the most important criteria for building a successful mission, as it will determine how receptive the involved parties are to de-escalating a conflict. While there are many different factors impacting the willingness of the different governments to fulfill UN objectives, the most important factor was the lack of cooperation between the parties (Gray 1996, 251). The historically ingrained resentment between the Croats of Croatia and the Serbs of FR Yugoslavia was too strong for the UN to facilitate agreements, as it was reinforced through centuries of political and socioeconomic events.

In the Literature Review, Paul Szasz attributed UNPROFOR as a failure because it was not authorized to use military action by the involved parties. Christine Gray's report further reiterated this weakness, discussing the limitations placed on UN action in Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croatia and FR Yugoslavia. A trend of the growing unwillingness of Croatia and FR Yugoslavia to participate in UNPROFOR between 1992 and 1995 is observed in Table 1. Both governments failed to meet important UN objectives, like the SOFAs, to ensure demilitarization of rival forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result, UNPROFOR could not meet this criteria.

Second, UNPROFOR failed to remain impartial and act in accordance with the UN code of conduct. While UN mandates and resolutions dictated the responsibilities of peacekeepers and prevented them from engaging in direct military actions, some Bosnian Serb combatant groups perceived the UN-controlled

“safe zones” as harboring Bosniak and Bosnian-Croat militants. Although these towns and cities were majority Bosnian Muslim and Croat, this misconception further mobilized Bosnian Serbs to target and shoot at peacekeepers.

Investigations of the mission also found some peacekeepers engaging in sexual misconduct and exploitation. Whether intentional or not, this abuse of power placed a strain on the relationship between the UN and Bosnian civilians. In the “Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, Prince Zeid of Jordan discussed the effects this weakened relationship had on UN accountability and member states’ receptiveness to participating in future missions. Instances of peacekeeper misconduct overshadow the successes and credibility of the UN. For these reasons, UNPROFOR failed to meet this criteria.

Third, UNPROFOR only partially fulfilled the criteria involving peacekeeper use of force. Based on the scale designed to test Measurement 2, UNPROFOR received a score indicating it incorporated this criteria to some extent. However, due to the nature of the Bosnian War and the UN mandates’ emphasis on protecting civilian “safe zones” from violence, UNPROFOR did not adequately meet this criteria. UN mandates should have permitted some use of force to protect UN “safe zones” and peacekeepers from the war. This may also be attributed to the inability of the involved parties to fully consent to UNPROFOR.

In his analysis of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Szasz noted one weakness of the mission were the limitations placed on peacekeepers from strict UN mandates (Szasz 1995, 687). For instance, the peacekeeping forces were permitted

to establish “safe zones” free of violence for noncombatants, but were not given the appropriate military directives to protect these zones. This inflexibility allowed for massacres like those in Srebrenica to occur in UN-protected cities. More than 200 peacekeepers and UN uniformed personnel sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina to participate in UNPROFOR were killed by combatants during the mission. For these reasons, UNPROFOR did not adequately fulfill this criteria.

The only criteria UNPROFOR fully incorporated was Measurement 4, indicating a successful conclusion to the mission. An article discussed in the Literature Review written by Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon, noted the UN’s acknowledgement of the vital role the international community plays in preventing the escalation of global or regional conflicts (Hultman et al 2013). While the initial UNPROFOR mission was concluded in mid-1995, the UN created several forces and missions to replace and ensure the successful transition of Bosnia-Herzegovina from a warring nation to a peaceful one under the Dayton Accords. UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina was replaced by a secondary UNPROFOR mission (1995-1996), UNPREDEP, and UNMIBH to uphold a long-term ceasefire and protect the country from engaging in another ethnic war. While the three UNSGs discussed in the Results section above and outlined in Table 5 perceived UNPROFOR as a failed operation, it is worth noting none were critical of UN actions after the conclusion of UNPROFOR.

Although UNPROFOR did not meet all four criteria, it is not solely to blame for the failure of the mission. The unwillingness of Croatia and FR Yugoslavia played a large role in the subsequent failure of the mission. As neither government was able



or entirely willing to demilitarize their respective ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN was greatly limited in its ability to facilitate an end to the conflict.

## **Conclusion**

While the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina is regarded as a failed operation, its deployment has since helped ensure the important role the UN plays in facilitating conflicts. The lessons learned by the international community from UNPROFOR illustrate the importance of supporting UN missions, and ensuring a country's receptiveness to hosting an operation. The UN should not be regarded as a means to end all global armed conflict, but rather as a tool that can be used in reaching negotiations to protect international security.

UNPROFOR's legacy will help determine the role the UN and international community must play in facilitating a conflict. The nature of UN peacekeeping is not to actively prevent or stop a conflict, but rather help the involved parties reach negotiations and assist in the enforcement of the agreements when appropriate.

This role is difficult to understand and even more difficult to practice, but it is strengthened with the conclusion of every peacekeeping operation. It is important to understand the role the UN played in Bosnia-Herzegovina to best understand the role of its authority in future missions. UNPROFOR may have failed to meet UN objectives, but it succeeded in showing the global community the necessity of peacekeeping operations.

## Appendices

### *Appendix A*

Questionnaire: How successful was the UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the criteria from Johansen, Diehl, Bellamy, and Williams?

1. **Consent:** What were the involved parties and did they maintain consent for the UNPROFOR Mission at the before the Bosnian War (1991), during the war (1992-1994), and at the end of the war (1995)? (1-5 rating)
2. **Military Intervention:** Did UN Peacekeepers use force? (1-5 rating)
3. **Impartiality:** Were peacekeepers impartial? Were there instances of misconduct during the mission? (1-5 rating)
4. **UNPROFOR Conclusion:** How did the UN conclude the UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina? Were there replacements for UNPROFOR? What are the reflections of the UN Secretary-Generals on UNPROFOR? (1-5 rating)

## Maps

Map 1: The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945 – 1991)



(Source: "Map Showing the Regions of Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1991")

Map 2: Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina, Divided Between the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina As Outlined In the 1995 Dayton Accords



(Source: "Bosnia-Herzegovina Political Map – Black and White")

## Tables

Table 1: Consent For UNPROFOR's Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Throughout the Duration of the Bosnian War

	<b>Before the Bosnian War (1991)</b>	<b>During the Bosnian War (1992-1994)</b>	<b>Before the Dayton Accords (1995)</b>
<b>The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina</b>	5; Explicit consent given	4; Consent given with some reservations	3; Some consent given with many reservations
<b>The Government of FR Yugoslavia</b>	5; Explicit consent given	2; Little consent given with many reservations	2; Little consent given with many reservations
<b>The Government of Croatia</b>	4; Consent given with some reservations	2; Little consent given with many reservations	1; Consent withdrawn

Table 2: The Factors Impacting Peacekeeper's Use of Force During the UNPROFOR Mission

<b>Size of the UNPROFOR force in Bosnia-Herzegovina</b>	7,000 - 38,000 peacekeepers
<b>Necessity for use of force</b> <i>1. Peacekeeper deaths</i>	207 deaths
<b>UN mandate leniency</b>	Strict; did not allow for force except for instances of self-defense
<b>Score: 3</b>	

Table 3: Fatalities Among United Nations Peacekeepers and Uniformed Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2015

Mission	Location	Duration	Average strength	Deaths	M. acts	Deaths/1000/year	M. acts/1000/year	Share m. acts (%)	Ch. VII	Use of force
UNMOT	Tajikistan	1994-2000	39	3	3	13.88	13.88	100	no	no
UNOMIG	Georgia	1994-2000	115	8	6	4.40	3.30	75	no	no
UNOSOM II	Somalia	1993-95	18 914	148	109	4.27	3.14	74	yes	yes
MINUSMA	Mali	2013-	8 407	60	40	3.57	2.38	67	yes	yes
UNAMIR	Rwanda	1993-96	3 111	26	14	3.46	1.86	54	no	no
UNAVEM II	Angola	1991-95	186	4	1	5.85	1.46	25	no	no
MONUA	Angola	1997-99	1 247	15	4	5.15	1.37	27	no	no
UNCRO	Croatia	1995-96	11 099	16	8	1.92	0.96	50	yes	no
UNPROFOR	Former Yugoslavia	1992-95	27 632	207	73	2.00	0.70	35	yes	yes
UNTAC	Cambodia	1992-93	14 433	61	16	2.42	0.63	26	no	no
UNAMID	Darfur	2007-	18 320	191	68	1.36	0.48	36	yes	yes
UNAVEM III	Angola	1995-97	5 377	34	6	2.62	0.46	18	no	no
UNTSO	Middle East	1948-	173	7	2	1.58	0.45	29	no	no
UNMIK	Kosovo	1999-	1 839	27	9	0.91	0.30	33	yes	no
ONUB	Burundi	2004-2006	4 467	22	3	1.97	0.27	14	yes	yes
UNISFA	Abyei	2011-	3 867	18	4	1.19	0.26	22	yes	yes
UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	1999-2005	11 106	172	17	2.51	0.25	10	yes	yes
MONUC	DRC	1999-2010	11 647	116	31	0.92	0.25	27	yes	yes
UNTAES	Former Yugoslavia	1996-98	3 956	10	2	1.17	0.23	20	yes	no
UNMISET	East Timor	2002-2005	2 929	13	2	1.48	0.23	15	yes	yes
UNMISS	South Sudan	2011-	8 253	18	7	0.56	0.22	39	yes	yes
MINURCAT	CAR/Chad	2007-10	1 519	2	1	0.40	0.20	50	yes	yes
UNMIH	Haiti	1993-96	3 808	9	1	1.23	0.14	11	no	no
MINUSTAH	Haiti	2004-	8 873	102	13	1.03	0.13	13	yes	no
MINUSCA	CAR	2014-	9 269	2	1	0.26	0.13	50	yes	yes
UNIFIL	Lebanon	1978-	6 913	120	22	0.68	0.12	18	no	yes
MONUSCO	DRC	2010-	19 881	67	10	0.67	0.10	15	yes	yes
UNTAET	East Timor	1999-2002	7 851	19	2	0.94	0.10	11	yes	yes
ONUMOZ	Mozambique	1992-94	5 152	25	1	2.43	0.10	4	no	no
UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	2004-	8 656	117	9	1.19	0.09	8	yes	yes
UNIKOM	Iraq/Kuwait	1991-2003	919	13	1	1.13	0.09	8	yes	no
UNDOF	Golan Heights	1947-	1 064	19	2	0.70	0.07	11	no	no
UNMIS	Sudan	2005-11	8 953	29	3	0.50	0.05	10	yes	yes
UNMIL	Liberia	2003-	11 295	153	3	1.15	0.02	2	yes	no
MIPONUH	Haiti	1997-2000	276	6	0	9.65	0	0	no	no
ONUSAL	El Salvador	1991-95	44	3	0	3.02	0	0	no	no
MINURSO	West Sahara	1991-	266	7	0	1.08	0	0	no	no
UNMIT	East Timor	2006-12	1 406	9	0	1.01	0	0	no	no
UNMOGIP	India/Pakistan	1949-	42	1	0	0.93	0	0	no	no
MINURCA	CAR	1998-2000	1 227	2	0	0.89	0	0	no	no
UNFICYP	Cyprus	1964-	1 170	25	0	0.84	0	0	no	no
UNMIBH	Bosnia and H.	1996-2002	1 737	9	0	0.76	0	0	no	no
UNPREDEP	Macedonia	1995-99	1 025	3	0	0.73	0	0	no	no
UNMEE	Eritrea/Ethiopia	2000-2008	3 057	13	0	0.53	0	0	no	no
UNSMIH	Haiti	1996-97	1 505	1	0	0.47	0	0	no	no
UNOSOM I	Somalia	1992-93	587	6	..	12.27	..	..	no	no

(Source: Van Der Lijn and Smit 2015)

Table 4: Instances of Peacekeeper Impartiality and Misconduct During the UNPROFOR Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina

<b>Act with impartiality, integrity, and tact</b>	UN peacekeeper actions to protect noncombatants was skewed as ethnic bias by Serbian combatants
<b>Misconduct</b>	
1. <i>Sexual exploitation/abuse</i> . . . . .	Some involvement in exploiting victims of sex trafficking and forced prostitution
2. <i>Disrespect to local laws, customs, or practices</i> . . . . .	Few or none recorded.
3. <i>Disrespectful treatment of host country civilian population (abuse of authority)</i> . . . . .	Few or none recorded.
<b>Score: 3</b>	

Table 5: The Conclusion of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and UN Action in the Post-Conflict Country

<b>Conclusions of UNPROFOR</b>	Restructured and replaced with UNCRO, UNPROFOR (1995-96), and UNPREDEP; SFOR replaces IFOR
<b>UN involvement in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina</b>	Yes; -UNPROFOR (1995-1996) -UNMIBH (1996-2002)
<b>UN Secretary-General reflections on UNPROFOR:</b>	
1. <i>Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996)</i> . . . . .	Failed; more resources should have been given to UNPROFOR.
2. <i>Kofi Annan (1997-2006)</i> . . . . .	Failed; Bosnia-Herzegovina will haunt UN history forever.
3. <i>Ban Ki-Moon (2007-Present)</i> . . . . .	Failed; international community must come together to prevent future massacres like Bosnia-Herzegovina
<b>Score: 2</b>	

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